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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the
decision of the Utah State Tax Commission pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §§ 59-1-602 (1) (a) (2000) and 63-46b-16(1) (1997) .
ISSUES PRESENTED/STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Does the doctrine of res

judicata

prevent Nebeker from

raising issues in this proceeding which it failed to raise in a
prior proceeding involving the same parties and same facts? (R.40.)

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §59-1-610 the Court is to grant

the Commission deference concerning the written findings of facts
supporting its decision and apply a correction of error standard
to its application of law.
2.

Does the doctrine of judicial estoppel have any

application to the facts presented?

(R.-37.)

Pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. §59-1-610 the Court should grant deference to the
findings of facts supporting the Commission's decision and apply
a correction of error standard to its application of law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nebeker appeals the dismissal of its Petition seeking a
partial refund of interest paid on special fuel taxes deemed due
following its appeal of an audit assessment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Jim Nebeker Trucking is a common carrier headquartered in
Roosevelt, Utah. (R.-89.)

Nebeker's fleet of tanker trucks is
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licensed under the International Fuel Tax Agreement ("IFTA")
(R.-89.)
By statutory notice dated November 20, 1995, Nebeker was
assessed a deficiency of $29,988.03, plus interest. (R.-89.)
Nebeker filed a Petition asserting some of its travel was not on
the "public highways" of the State and was therefore not taxable.
(R.-90.)
On January 20, 1998, a formal hearing was held before the
Tax Commission. (R.-88.)

On May 12, 1998, the Commission issued

a formal decision. (R.-88-102.)

The Order granted partial relief

to Nebeker, and the parties attempted to reconstruct Nebeker's
off-highway mileage in accordance with the Order. (R.-100.)
A second statutory notice was sent on or about September 30,
1999. (R.-128.)

After receiving additional information from

Nebeker, a third statutory notice was sent on or about March 30,
1999. (R.-129.)
Nebeker did not file a Petition for Redetermination of this
notice.

The statutory notice became a final assessment pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. §59-1-503 (2000) thirty days from the date the
notice was sent, which would be on or about April 29, 1999. (R.128.)

Nebeker tendered partial payment of the assessment on May

14, 1999. (R.-172.)
On June 9, 1999, Nebeker filed an original action in the 8th

2

District Court, Case No. 990000127CR1.

Nebeker tendered the

remaining amount due July 14, 1999. (R.-175.)

On July 15, 1999,

the Tax Commission moved to dismiss the District Court Complaint
for lack of jurisdiction. (R.-46.)

On August 26, 1999, Judge

Lyle Anderson of the 8th District Court, granted the Motion.
(R.-84.)

On September 23, 1999, Nebeker appealed the District

Court's dismissal2.
On or about September 15, 1999, just prior to appealing the
District Court decision, Nebeker applied to the Tax Commission
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §59-13-318(1996) for a refund of a
portion of the interest paid. (R.-151-52.)

The claim for refund

was denied by the Auditing Division by statutory notice dated
October 27, 1999. (R.-135-36.)

On November 4, 1999, Nebeker

filed a Petition for Redetermination to have the Tax Commission
reconsider the Auditing Division decision.
(R.-125-26.)
On December 14, 1999, the Auditing Division filed a Motion
to Dismiss the Petition asserting res judicata
74,-108.)

as a defense. (R.-

The matter was fully briefed and a hearing held March

23, 2000. (R.-32,-37,-55.)

On August 31, 2000, the Commission

1

The pleadings from the district court case are part of the
record in Appeal No. 990835-SC which has been consolidated with
this case. The pleadings are attached as exhibits to Appellee's
Brief in Appeal No. 990835-SC.
2

Appeal of the District Court action has progressed as
Supreme Court Appeal No. 990835-SC.
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issued its decision and Order. (R.-10.)
Nebeker filed its Petition for Review on September 28, 2000.
(R.-l.)

On November 9, 2000, the appeal was dismissed by Order

of the Supreme Court for failure to file a docketing statement.
On November 17, 2000, Nebeker filed its docketing statement and
the appeal was reinstated pursuant to the Court's prior Order.
On November 22, 2000, the Commission filed a Suggestion of
Mootness regarding appeal no. 990835-SC.

Following oral

argument, the Court issued an Order dated January 18, 2000,
consolidating this appeal of the Tax Commission's dismissal based
on res

judicata,

appeal no. 20000834, with the appeal of the

District Court's dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction, appeal
no. 990835-SC.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The doctrine of res
decisions in Utah.

judicata

has long been applied to agency

Where an issue is raised, or could of have

been raised, in a prior proceeding involving the same parties,
which resulted in a final determination, the doctrine prevents a
party from re-litigating those claims or issues in a subsequent
proceeding involving the same parties.

Nebeker was therefore

required to raise all issues it had with its audit assessment in
the prior proceeding challenging that assessment.

Nebeker is

therefore barred from raising issues which could and should have
been raised in that proceeding in a subsequent proceeding
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involving the same parties.

Therefore, the Commission properly

applied the doctrine of res judicata

in barring this action.

The Tax Commission has both constitutional and statutory
authority over appeals challenging audit assessments.

It

therefore had subject matter jurisdiction over the prior
proceeding.

Nebeker's issue regarding the interest calculation

was an issue which was present and required to be presented to
the Commission in prior proceeding.

The fact that Nebeker

challenges the constitutional basis of the interest rate used
does not excuse Nebeker from the obligation to raise the issue
before the Commission.

The issue is one that could have been

mooted or avoided by the Commission in the manner in which they
ruled upon the case.

The Commission could have granted relief on

other grounds not involving the constitutional question.
The requirement in this State, as well as many other wellreasoned decisions from across the country, is that a party must
raise all issues it has with an administrative agency through its
appeal before the agency.

This is true even if the issue calls

into question the constitutionality of statutes or rules which
are beyond the agency's authority to revoke.

This requirement is

supported by sound public policy and will promote judicial
economy and efficiency in the administration of justice.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply.

The Tax

Commission has not changed the legal position taken in these
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proceedings from the legal position taken in the District Court
action.

Therefore, the Tax Commission acted properly in

dismissing Nebeker's appeal and its Order of Dismissal should be
affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Commission Properly Applied Res

The doctrine of res

judicata

Judicata.

deals with the preclusive

effects given to judgments; it prevents parties from relitigating the claims that have, or could have been litigated on
the merits and have resulted in a final decision.

Salt Lake City

v. Silverfork Pipeline Co., 913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1995).
applying res
met.

judicata

In

or claim preclusion, three criteria must be

First, both cases must involve the same parties or their

privies or assigns.

Second, the claim sought to be barred either

must have be presented or have been available to be presented in
the first case; and third, the first suit must have resulted in a
final judgment on the merits.

In re: Rights to Use Water v.

Springville 982 P.2d 65 (Utah 1999); citing Fitzgerald v. Corbit,
793 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah 1990).
The doctrine is premised on the principle that a
controversy should only be adjudicated once. Although
initially developed with respect to the judgments of
courts, the same basic policies, including the need for
finality in administrative decisions, support the
application of the doctrine of res judicata
to
administrative agency determinations.
Salt Lake Citizens Congress v. Mountain States Telephone &
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Telegraph Co., 846 P.2d 1245, 1250 (Utah 1992).
res

judicata

"The doctrine of

has been applied to administrative decisions in Utah

since at least 1950."

Id.

In this case, all three requirements are satisfied.

First,

both this case and the prior Tax Commission appeal, no.95-1597,
involve the same parties; Jim Nebeker dba Nebeker Trucking as the
Petitioner, and the Auditing Division of the State Tax Commission
as the Respondent.

This point is not in dispute.

Second, the claim was available to have been presented in
the first matter.

In the prior matter the Tax Commission had

issued a deficiency against Petitioner.

That deficiency clearly

calculated interest due at the rate of 12%.

It is a well-

established rule that issues not raised before an administrative
body are waived on appeal.

Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d

982, 985 (Utah App. 1998); Gibson v. Board of Review of Indus.
Comm'n, 707 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah 1985); Pease v. Indus. Comm'n,
694 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1984); Ashcroft v. Indus. Comm'n, 855
P.2d 267, 268-69 (Utah App. 1993).

The policy for this rule is

the promotion of judicial efficiency.

By raising an issue at the

formal hearing, the Commission could have adjudicated the issue
concurrent with its deliberations on the other issues raised.
Matters should not be litigated piecemeal, one issue at a time.
The convoluted nature of the proceedings bringing the
parties before the Court in these consolidated appeals are ample
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evidence of the wisdom in requiring all issues to be raised in a
single proceeding.

Had Nebeker preserved the issue in appeal no.

95-1597, it could have presented it directly to the Supreme Court
on appeal of that decision.

The Court would have the matter

presented in context and, as the ultimate authority on state
constitutional questions, could have issued a ruling in a timely
and efficient manner.
The fact that the issue was constitutional in nature
however, does not excuse Nebeker from the requirement to raise
the issue before the commission.

In State Tax Comm'n v. Iverson,

782 P.2d 519 (Utah 1989), the Court held that even though the
Commission could not decide questions of legality and
constitutionality, petitioners still had to follow the exclusive
method of seeking redress through the Commission before appealing
to a court capable of deciding those questions.

.Id. at 525.

Likewise in Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 621 P.2d
1234, 1237,(Utah 1980); the Court found:
Plaintiffs' assertion of a constitutional issue does
not alter the necessity for compliance with the
requirement of first adjudicating their claim before
the retirement board. Administrative agencies do not
generally determine the constitutionality of their
organic legislation. (Citations omitted.) But the mere
introduction of a constitutional issue does not obviate
the need for exhaustion of administrative remedies. As
stated in Public Utilities, 355 U.S. at 539-40, xif...
an administrative proceeding might leave no remnant of
the constitutional question, the administrative remedy
plainly should be pursued.'
The third requirement is also met.
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The prior hearing

resulted in a Final Decision of the Commission (R.88-101).
Petitioner was required to raise all issues it had with the
assessment at the formal hearing that was held in its appeal of
the audit assessment, no. 95-1597.

It failed to raise the issue.

Therefore, Petitioner is precluded by the doctrine of
judicata

res

from raising in a separate proceeding issues which could

and should have been raised when it had its full day in court.
The doctrine of res

judicata

"reflects the expectations that

parties who are given the capacity to present their entire
controversies shall in fact do so."

Ringwood v. Foreign Auto

Works, 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 (Utah App. 1990); (quoting Restatement
2d Judgments §24(1982)).
II.

The Tax Commission Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over
Appeal No. 95-1597.

The thrust of Nebeker's argument is that the Tax Commission
lacked subject matter jurisdiction in appeal 95-1597 to hear the
interest issue; therefore, res

judicata

should not bar it from

raising the interest issue directly in a subsequent appeal to the
Commission.

This argument must fail since the Commission had

subject matter jurisdiction.
The cases cited by Nebeker indicate that "typically agencies
have limited subject matter jurisdiction."
P.2d 531, 533 (Utah App. 1992).

SMP v. Kirkman, 843

While this statement may be true

generally, the Tax Commission had both constitutional and direct
statutory basis for subject matter jurisdiction.
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Appeal 95-1597

was an appeal of an audit assessment.

The Utah Constitution,

Article XIII, Section 11(3) grants the Commission both the duty
and authority to "administer and supervise the tax laws of the
state."

This constitutional authority is reflected in the

statutory language of Utah Code Ann. §59-1-210(2000) which also
places the administration of the tax laws within the Commission's
jurisdiction.

Utah Code Ann. §59-1-501(2000) gives the

Commission authority to hear appeals based upon a petition for
redetermination of an audit deficiency.

Utah Code Ann. §59-13-

313(2000) gives the Commission specific authority for
administration of Part 3 of Title 59, Section 13, special fuels.
In addition to the authority granted under §59-1-210(25) to
perform uany further duties imposed by law" and "exercise all
powers necessary in the performance of its duties," the
Commission is given specific authority in Utah Code Ann. §59-1401(10)(2000) (section effective until July 2, 2001) to "waive,
reduce, or compromise any of the penalties or interest imposed
under this part."
Nebeker's Petition for Redetermination in Appeal No. 95-1597
falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the Commission as
granted by both constitutional and statutory authority.

Nebeker

has not claimed that the Order rendered in case no. 95-1597 is
void.

Nor do they appear willing to renounce the partial relief

the Commission provided them in that Order.
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Therefore, Nebeker's

claim that the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction in
the prior appeal is without merit.
III. Nebeker Was Required to Raise its Constitutional Issues
in the Prior Proceeding.
As argued above, the Commission had subject matter
jurisdiction over the prior appeal.

Appeal of agency decisions

is statutory and requires compliance with the statutorily
mandated procedures.

See, Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Utah State

Tax Comm'n, 999 p.2d 17 f 23 (Utah 2000).

Utah Code Ann. §59-1-

601 provides for review of final agency actions by the District
Court or the Supreme Court.

District Court jurisdiction is

limited by the Utah Constitution, Article XIII, Section 11, which
allows the Legislature to provide for review of "matters decided
by the Commission."

It is well-settled that the Supreme Court

will not review matters which were not raised before the
administrative agency.
(Utah App. 1988) .

Whitear v. Labor Commission, 973 P.2d 982

Therefore, under Utah law, a party having an

appeal before the Utah State Tax Commission is required to raise
all issues it has with the assessment in order to preserve those
issues for appeal.
This case is distinguishable from the authority cited by
Nebeker.

It does not involve a question of whether the agency

had jurisdiction over the prior action.

The Tax Commission

clearly had subject matter jurisdiction over Appeal No. 95-1597.
This case does not inquire whether Nebeker was required to first
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initiate an action at the Commission before pursuing another
remedy.

In this case, Nebeker voluntarily filed a petition

before the Utah State Tax Commission seeking appeal of its audit
assessment.

Extensive discovery was done.

The parties briefed

and argued several complex issues at the formal hearing.
hearing resulted in Nebeker receiving partial relief.

That

If Nebeker

had issues regarding the calculation of its tax deficiency, it
was required to raise those issues in that proceeding in order to
preserve those issues for appeal.
Where the constitutional issue may be resolved by "any twist
or turn the case may have taken at the Commission" a party is
required to give the Commission the opportunity to resolve it.
See, Brumlev v. State Tax Comm'n, 868 P.2d 796 (Utah 1993).

If

Nebeker had received complete, rather than partial relief, in
appeal 95-1597, it is possible, if not likely, that no vestige of
the constitutional issue would have remained.

The Commission

also has authority to waive or compromise interest, Utah Code
Ann. §59-1-401(10), therefore the Commission could have granted
the relief requested without ruling on the constitutionality of
the statute.

"If an administrative proceeding might leave no

remnant of the constitutional question, the administrative remedy
plainly should be pursued."

Public Utilities Commission of

California v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958); 3 Davis Admin.
Treatise 20.04 (1958), as cited in Johnson v. State Retirement
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Office, 621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980).

The Court's final observation

in Johnson applies with equal force to the fact situation
presented here:
The instant case involves issues other than the
constitutional claim, and pursuit of plaintiff's
administrative remedies might obviate the need for
addressing that issue. If not, judicial attention to
the constitutional issue, as well as other issues, will
be better framed by the structure of a factual context.
(Citations omitted.) (Id. at 1237.)
Other jurisdictions have followed this reasoning and
specifically required that constitutional challenges to taxes be
brought before the administrative body charged with the
administration of taxation.

In Indiana v. Sproles, 672 N.E.2d

1353 (Ind. 1996), the Indiana Court cited the following reasons
for requiring a party to bring a constitutional challenge before
the Department of State Revenue even though that Department had
no authority to strike down a tax statute.

First, the legality

of a tax could not be challenged until statutory remedies had
been exhausted.

Second, requiring exhaustion as a prerequisite

in constitutionally based challenges to a tax, served to preserve
order in the tax collection process; and third, it would give the
Department an opportunity to revoke the assessment on nonconstitutional grounds.

Citing, Felix v. Indiana Dept. of State

Revenue, 501 N.E.2d 119, 121-22 (Ind. App. 1986).
This holding was reiterated in a recent Indiana case:

State

Board of Tax Commissioners v. Montgomery, 730 N.E.2d 680 (Ind.

13

2000).

In that case, the petitioners attempted to bypass the

administrative agency and file an action directly in the tax
court challenging the constitutionality of the "health care for
indigent property tax program."

The Indiana Supreme Court found

that the tax court lacked jurisdiction because the petitioner had
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.

Citing Sproles,

the court found that the taxpayer could not circumvent
administrative remedies and challenge the constitutionality of a
tax directly in court, even if the administrative agency to which
the taxpayer appeals is without the power to grant the exact
remedy the taxpayer seeks.

.Id. at 684.

The State of Missouri has adopted a similar policy.

In

LaMay Building Corp. v. Director of Revenue, 889 S.W.2d 835, 837
(Mo. 1994), the court found that constitutional issues not raised
at the first opportunity are deemed waived.

Missouri has

specifically held that when a party is challenging the
application of a statute before an administrative agency on
constitutional grounds, that party must raise the constitutional
issue and preserve it for appeal before the agency.

Duncan v.

Missouri Board, 744 S.W.2d 524, 531 (Mo. App. E.D. 1988).

The

purpose of this rule is to bring to the attention of the tribunal
the constitutional objection and allow the tribunal to correct
itself.
Moreover it is imperative to an efficient and fair
administration of justice that a litigant may not
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withhold his objections, await the outcome, and then
complain that he was denied his rights if he does not
approve the resulting decision. (Citations omitted.)
Tate v. Dept. of Social Services, 18 S.W.3d 3, 7 (Mo.
App. E.D. 2000).
In McQuav v. Arkansas State Board of Architects, 989 S.W.2d
499 (Ark. 1999), the Arkansas Supreme Court stated its rationale
for requiring litigants to raise challenges to the
constitutionality of a statute before the agency itself.
[W]e will not set aside an administrative determination
upon a ground not presented to the agency because to do
so would deprive the agency of the opportunity to
consider the matter, make its ruling, and state the
reasons for its actions. (Citations omitted.) The
same applies to constitutional arguments not raised at
the agency level. Xd. at 344.
The Arkansas Court went on to state:
[E]ven though the Workers' Compensation Commission may
not have authority to declare statutes
unconstitutional, such constitutional issues should
first be raised at the Administrative Law Judge or
Commission level because such issues often require an
exhaustive analysis that is best accomplished by an
adversary proceeding, which can only been done at the
hearing level. (Citation omitted.) IdL at 344. See
also, Hamilton v. Jeffrey Stone Co., 641 S.W.2d 723
(1982) .
The Supreme Court of Iowa likewise requires that
constitutional issues be raised at the agency level to be
preserved for judicial review.

Soo Line Railroad Co. v. Iowa

Dept. of Transportation, 521 N.W.2d 685, 687 (Iowa 1994); Fisher
v. Board of Optometry Examiners, 478 N.W.2d 609, 612 (Iowa 1991);
Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 465
N.W.2d 280, 283 (Iowa 1991).

This is despite the fact that the
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administrative agencies lack authority to decide constitutional
questions.

Id. 465 N.W.2d at 283.

The Georgia Supreme Court has also found that a
constitutional challenge must be first raised in an agency
proceeding.

Georgia Real Estate Comm'n v. Burnette, 255 S.E.2d

38, (Ga. 1979) .

In Pence v. Georgia Board of Dentistry, 478

S.E.2d 437, 442 (Ga. App. 1996), the Georgia Court of Appeals
stated:
The fact that one basis, or even the sole basis, of a
respondent's complaint as to the hearing officer's
initial decision is a constitutional attack, does not
eliminate the necessity for agency review as a
prerequisite to judicial review. (Citing Dept. of
Public Safety v. Foreman, 202 S.E.2d 196 (Ga. App.
1973) .)
As pointed out in the above cases, an aggrieved party must
raise and preserve all of its issues before the agency, even if
those issues involve the constitutionality of statutory
provisions which may be beyond the authority of the agency to
determine.
These cases also point out the distinction between subject
matter jurisdiction and authority.

Matters may be clearly within

the subject matter jurisdiction of an agency even though the
requested remedy may be beyond the agency's authority.
In Nebeker's prior appeal before the Commission, No. 951597, the Utah State Tax Commission had subject matter
jurisdiction.

Nebeker was required to raise all issues it had
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with the assessment at that time.

Even though the Tax Commission

lacked authority to declare §59-13-501 unconstitutional, the
Commission did have authority and ability to obviate or moot the
question of interest by granting Nebeker relief from the tax
assessment or by granting Nebeker relief from the interest on
other grounds.

Since the issue is one which could have been

resolved by the Commission without reaching the constitutional
question, it is clearly one which was required to have been
raised before the agency.
The requirement to raise a constitutional issue before an
agency is supported by sound policy reasons as stated in the
cases cited above.

Those policies apply with even greater force

when the constitutionality of a taxing statute is called into
question.

"This Court has consistently upheld the Tax

Commission's authority to carry out its responsibilities in
furthering its constitutional and statutory mandate" [to
administer and supervise the tax laws of the State].

Howell v.

County Board of Equalization, 881 P.2d 880, 889 (Utah 1994) .
Because of the potentially disruptive affect that invalidating a
state taxing statute may have on the operation of state
government, the stated policy of the Court, that statutes are
presumed to be constitutional3 and that constitutional issues

See, Hovle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240 (Utah 1980).
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should be avoided where possible4, should apply with even greater
force when it comes to constitutional challenges to tax statutes.
The Tax Commission as the agency given the constitutional
duty to administer and supervise the tax laws of the State should
be given an opportunity to rule on a matter where the ruling may
moot or avoid constitutional questions.

This rationale is also

supported by the Court's recognition in Evans & Sutherland v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435 (Utah 1997), that the courts
may not encroach upon the Tax Commission's role carrying out its
constitutional duties.

Requiring the constitutional issue to be

raised before the Commission promotes the efficient use of
judicial resources and administration of justice.

If the issue

cannot be avoided or resolved at the Commission level, it may be
appealed directly to the Supreme Court for resolution.

The Court

would then have the advantage of having the issue presented where
the factual context has been fully established in an adversarial
proceeding.
There is no question that had Petitioner taken a direct
appeal from the ruling in case no. 95-1597 the Court would have
not allowed it to raise the constitutional question.

Whitear v.

Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 1988) . Nebeker should not
be able to avoid this result by attempting to bring a second

4

Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634,
637 (Utah 1979).
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proceeding raising issues that were available to have been
presented to the Commission in its original appeal.
IV.

Judicial Estoppel Does Not Apply.

Attached as Exhibit "B" to the Tax Commission's Brief in
Appeal No. 990835-SC, with which this appeal is consolidated, is
the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Tax
Commission's Motion to Dismiss the District Court Complaint for
Lack of Jurisdiction.

After addressing Nebeker's stated basis

for jurisdiction, the Commission addressed the stated basis for
venue, Utah Code Ann. §63-46a-12.1, as a potential basis for
jurisdiction.

That section provides, "A person aggrieved by a

rule may obtain judicial review of the rule by filing a complaint
with the county clerk in the district court where the person
resides or in the district court in Salt Lake county."

The rule

also requires that the person exhaust their administration
remedies by filing an action with the Commission before filing
the complaint unless filing the action with the Commission would
cause the person "irreparable harm."

Utah Code Ann. §63-46a-

12.1(2) (a) and (2) (b) (iii) (1997) .
The position the Tax Commission took at the prior proceeding
was^that Nebeker would suffer no "irreparable harm" if it were
forced to bring a challenge to the rule before the Commission as
required by that section.

In the course of making that argument,

the following statement was made at page 5 and 6 of the
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Memorandum.
Although Petitioner alleges 'irreparable harm' in its
petition, it does not state facts which would support
any harm whatsoever. Petitioner alleges that the
Commission failed to follow the provisions of the
administrative rulemaking act in adopting the
applicable interest rate. Even assuming, for purposes
of argument, that Petitioner could prove its case in
all respects, the only harm alleged or implied would be
overpayment by Petitioner of interest on the
assessment. There exists a statutory remedy for
obtaining refunds of overpayments. A person in such a
situation, if successful in proving their case before
the Commission, could be made whole by the repayment of
any overpayment with interest. Therefore, no harm
would result, much less irreparable harm. Therefore,
the irreparable harm exception to the exhaustion
requirement of Utah Code Ann. §63-46a-12.1 does not
provide Petitioner relief.
The Memorandum goes on to argue that even if irreparable harm had
been shown, that Nebeker's claim, if brought under §63-46a-12.1,
would be barred by the specific provisions of Utah Code Ann. §6346a-14 which provides that such a contest must be brought within
two years of the effective date of the rule.
The statement Petitioner apparently relies on in making its
claim is the statement that "there exists a statutory remedy for
obtaining refunds of overpayments."

The next two sentences of

the Memorandum qualify the prior statement and point out the
purpose for which it was made.

They read, "A person in such a

situation, if successful in proving their case before the
Commission could be made whole by the repayment of any
overpayment with interest.

Therefore no harm would result much
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less irreparable harm.5"

This statement acknowledges that a

person making a claim for refund would have to successfully
overcome any defenses which may exist to that claim, factual or
legal.

The purpose of this statement was to argue that, by

definition, irreparable harm is not the type of harm which can be
compensated in money damages.

Black's Law Dictionary, 7th

Edition, defines 'irreparable injury' as, "An injury that cannot
be adequately measured or compensated by money and is therefore
often considered remediable by injunction - Also termed,
'irreparable harm'."

Therefore, the position taken in the prior

litigation was that Nebeker had not made a showing of irreparable
harm that would excuse it from the exhaustion requirement of Utah
Code Ann. §63-46a-12.1, not because of the existence or
nonexistence of a legal remedy, but because the harm claimed was
for money damages and was therefore not uirreparable harm" by
definition.
There has been no "change of position" taken in this
litigation.

The position was, and still is, that Nebeker would

suffer no irreparable harm if required to bring any challenge it
had to a Tax Commission rule before the Commission prior to
proceeding in District Court.
The fact that the Commission raised a defense of res

5

See, Exhibit "B", Tax Commission Brief in Appeal No.
990835-SC, page 6.
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judicata

to Nebeker's claim for refund is not a change of

position from what was argued to the District Court below.

Page

6 of its Reply Memorandum attached as Exhibit "D" to the Tax
Commission's Brief in Appeal No. 990835-SC the Commission states:
Petitioner fails to point out that it has had one full,
fair and complete hearing before the Tax Commission.
Petitioner's failure to raise this issue at that time,
may well form the basis for a Motion to Dismiss should
Petitioner find a jurisdictional basis to maintain an
action.
The position taken in the prior matter, that Petitioner should
have raised this issue in its prior hearing, is consistent with
the defense of res

judicata

which formed the basis of the Tax

Commission's ruling in this appeal.
CONCLUSION
The elements of res
Commission.

judicata

were properly found by the Tax

The constitutional claim which Petitioner attempts

to raise separately in this action was a claim which was present
at the time it contested its audit assessment.

Since Nebeker

failed to raise this issue in its prior appeal, the Tax
Commission was correct in determining that the doctrine of
judicata

res

would bar this action.

Respectfully submitted this

i^ 1 4 day of ffl^L

2001.

Clark^L.Snelson
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Utah State Tax Commission
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